Strategic Studies India

Cogitatum on Bringing Back India's Most Wanted: A 2018 Field Note

Dipankar Sarkar
Dipankar Sarkar · · 5 min read

This is a field note from the Takshashila Cogitatum on Bringing Back India’s Most Wanted (March 14-21, 2018). The Cogitatum format is the Takshashila signature: a small cohort, scenario-based learning, expert practitioner briefings, and a final synthesis. I completed the Cogitatum with Distinction. This is what stuck with me.

The problem

India’s most wanted — economic offenders, fugitives from justice, defaulters — are a real and persistent problem. Names like Vijay Mallya, Nirav Modi, Mehul Choksi, Lalit Modi were in the news in 2018 (and still are). The question for the Cogitatum: what tools does India actually have to bring them back, and what would it take to use them effectively?

The four categories of tool

The practitioners briefed the cohort on the legal-diplomatic-operational-financial toolkit. The four categories:

  • Extradition treaties. India has extradition treaties with 48 countries. The problem: not all wanted persons are in treaty countries (the UAE, for example, has refused extradition requests). The solution: bilateral negotiations, often with non-justice considerations attached.
  • Interpol Red Notices. A request from one country to another to locate and arrest a fugitive. India issues Red Notices, but the UAE and the UK have been slow to act on them.
  • Domestic criminal law. The Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), the Fugitive Economic Offenders Act (FEOA, 2018), and the Indian Penal Code. The FEOA was passed in 2018 specifically to address the most-wanted problem. The act allows for confiscation of property without a conviction.
  • Constitutional law. Article 21 (right to life) and Article 20 (ex-post-facto law) constrain what India can do domestically. The Supreme Court has been a check on the use of preventive detention and PMLA.

2. Diplomatic

  • Bilateral pressure. The most effective tool in practice. India uses its diplomatic relationships to pressure countries to act. The challenge: many of the countries where fugitives are located (UAE, UK, Caribbean islands) have their own legal systems and political considerations.
  • Multilateral pressure. The FATF (Financial Action Task Force) is the most effective multilateral forum. India uses its FATF membership to push for action. The challenge: FATF is slow and consensus-based.
  • Public pressure. Naming and shaming. The Indian media is a powerful tool here. The challenge: the fugitives have their own media strategies.

3. Operational

  • CBI and ED investigations. The Central Bureau of Investigation and the Enforcement Directorate are the two main agencies. The challenge: both are under-resourced and the cases are complex.
  • Interpol operations. India participates in Interpol operations but is often on the requesting end, not the receiving end. The challenge: reciprocity is uneven.
  • CBI attaches overseas. India can send CBI teams overseas to gather evidence, but the host country’s cooperation is variable.

4. Financial

  • Asset confiscation. India can confiscate domestic assets of fugitives, but the assets are often held overseas.
  • Bank account freezes. India can request foreign banks to freeze accounts. The challenge: many fugitives use shell companies and trusts.
  • Sanctions coordination. India can coordinate with foreign governments on targeted sanctions. The challenge: this requires diplomatic capital that India often does not have.

What the practitioners said

The most senior practitioners who briefed the cohort were clear-eyed:

  • The legal tools are necessary but insufficient. Extradition treaties are a tool, not a solution.
  • The diplomatic tools are most effective in practice. Bilateral pressure works, especially when tied to trade or strategic considerations.
  • The operational tools are under-resourced. CBI and ED need more capacity, more training, more international cooperation.
  • The financial tools are slow but cumulative. Asset confiscation is a long game.

The conclusion: bringing back India’s most wanted is a 10-20 year project, not a 1-2 year project. It requires sustained diplomatic effort, legal reform, and operational capacity building.

What changed since 2018

Six years later, the picture is mixed:

  • The FEOA has been used. Several high-profile fugitives have had their assets confiscated under the act. The legal framework is in place.
  • Extradition has been slow but real. Some fugitives have been brought back. Others have stayed abroad. The diplomatic effort is real but slow.
  • CBI and ED capacity has grown. Both agencies are bigger and better trained than in 2018. But they are still under-resourced relative to the scale of the problem.
  • The diplomatic infrastructure has improved. India’s relationships with the UAE, the UK, and the Caribbean countries have all moved in the right direction.

The 2018 Cogitatum conclusion stands: the tools are there, the diplomatic capital is growing, but the work is not done.

What I took away

The Cogitatum shaped how I think about the relationship between law, diplomacy, and operational capacity. The three are not alternatives — they are complementary. India needs all three, in balance, sustained over decades.

I came out of the Cogitatum with two specific commitments:

  1. In my work as an angel investor, I would prefer companies that take compliance seriously. The cost of non-compliance — for the founder, the team, the investors — is too high.
  2. In my work as a startup consultant, I would push founders to build legal and operational discipline from day one. The first $1M in revenue is the easy part. The first regulatory inquiry is the test.

— Dipankar Sarkar Takshashila Institution alumnus (Cogitatum with Distinction)

This is a 2026 reflection on a 2018 Cogitatum. The original materials are property of The Takshashila Institution. The views here are my own.